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Abstract
This paper refers on an experiment comparing the propensity to punish unfair behavior with
the desire to help the victims of unfairness, in presence of a budget constraint and without the
expectation of a long-run pecuniary gain. The possibility that subjects’ behavior changes
when the initial endowment is earned instead of being randomly assigned is considered.
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In experimental economics, the most studied reaction to unfairness is punishment. The 
typical experiment analyzes the relationship between the punishment of unfair subjects and 
the unfairness they committed on the basis of the relationship existing between the unfair 
subject and the punisher (for survey and discussion see Camerer and Fehr, 2003; Ottone, 
2006). In particular, research concentrates mostly on the analysis of second party 
punishment, despite the importance of third party punishment as a social norm enforcement 
device (Gintis, 2000; Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). 
Under this aspect, this paper has a twofold aim. First of all, it analyzes the external 
observers’ tendency both to punish the unfair and to help the victims, in presence of a 
budget constraint. Secondly, it observes how subjects behave when their initial endowment 
is earned and not received as a windfall gain – as, for instance, in Güth et al. (1986), 
Hoffman et al. (1994) and Bosman et al. (2005).  
 
2  The experimental design 
The experimental design consists of three treatments: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the 
Solomon’s Game Treatment (SGT) and the Endowment Effect Treatment (EET). In the 
BT, the tool was the original Third Party Punishment Game  proposed by Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004). At the beginning of the first stage each subject was randomly assigned 
a role (A, B or C) and 8 groups of 3 participants were formed. In each group, participant A 
(the Dictator) and participant B (the Receiver) played a Dictator Game
1. In the second 
stage participant C (the Observer) entered the game and had to decide either to spend some 
amount to sanction A or to keep the whole sum. A's and C’s initial endowment was the 
same (10 euro) and the cost for participant C to punish participant A for the amount of 1 
euro, was 0.5 euro. 
In the SGT, I used a variant on the Third Party Punishment Game - the Solomon’s 
Game - where the Observer could: 1) transfer money to B; 2) spend money to sanction A; 
3) both punish A and transfer money to B; 4) keep the whole sum.
2  
In the EET, I used again the Solomon’s Game, but in this case participants had to earn 
their initial endowment. At the beginning of each session I asked them to solve some 
jigsaws for 15 minutes. When time was over, I assigned participants a score on the basis of 
the puzzles they had solved correctly.  Two thirds of the subjects (those who scored 
highest) earned 10 Euro and were assigned the role of either participant A or participant C. 
The others started the second stage of the treatment with no money and were assigned the 
role of participant B
3. 
The experiment was run in the Laboratory of experimental economics ALEX in 
Alessandria, Italy, using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 1999)
4. Overall, 2 sessions for 
each treatment were run, with a total of 141 participants (48 participants both in the BT and 
in the SGT, 45 in the EET). At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed 
about the sequential form of the game. Each subject participated in only one session and 
partners’ identities were unknown even when the experiment was over. The strategy 
                                                 
1  Only transfers of whole euros were allowed.  
2 Both in the Third Party Punishment Game and in the Solomon’s Game, in the equilibrium prediction, 
participant C would never punish participant A, and participant A would keep for her/himself the whole sum. 
3 Participants knew the scoring system. 




method at the Observer’s stage was implemented.
5 Each session lasted about 45 minutes 
for the BT and the SGT, and about 70 minutes for the EET. Each subject earned on average 
5.86 Euro. 
 
3  Results and discussion 
Result 1. The Observers’ transfers appear to be complementary to punishment at high 
levels of unfairness and substitute at low levels of unfairness. 
When I add the possibility for the Observer to transfer money to the Receiver, two 
cases may occur. The transfer may either be a complementary good of the punishment or a 
substitute. Actually, both punishment and transfer from the Observer significantly decrease 
as the Dictator’s transfer increases (see Table 1 and Figure 1). A bivariate probit regression 
indicates that the probability of C punishing A is related to the probability of A transferring  
to B (see Table 2).  
Overall, the punishment (P) from the Observer to the Dictator and the transfer (T) 
from the Observer to the Receiver are significantly correlated if the transfer from A to B is 
0 or 1 (Spearman correlation; p = 0.054 and p = 0.051 respectively); but not if the transfer 
ranges from 2 to 5 (p > 0.13).  Moreover, in the BT the punishment is significantly higher 
than in the SGT if the transfer from A to B ranges 3-5 (Mann-Whitney test; p < 0.05). This 
suggests that at high levels of unfairness an external observer will try both to punish the 
unfair behavior and to help the victim, while at low levels of unfairness s/he will substitute 
punishment with help.
6 This result is supported also by a random effect Tobit regression, 
according to which punishment decreases following the interaction between participant A’s 
transfer and the possibility  for participant C to transfer money to participant B. The fact 
that the coefficient related to the possibility for C to transfer money to B is zero means that 
when A’s transfer is zero, punishment is the same in all the treatments. However, as 
participant A’s transfer rises, punishment falls towards zero, and it falls faster when the 
Solomon’s Game is played. 
Result 2.  When participants have to earn their endowment, participants C both 
punish and transfer less than in the SGT.  
This result is confirmed by the random effect Tobit regression (see Table 1 and 
Figure 1), but the bivariate probit reports a significantly lower probability to transfer only 
in the EET (see Table 2). This may imply that the fact that the endowment is earned affects 
the level of punishments and transfers and the probability to transfer, but not the 
probability to punish.  
Result 3. People’s preferences are heterogeneous. 
Analysing the Observers’ behavior, four different types can be identified (see Figure 
2): 
-  “selfish”: an Observer who never intervenes; 
-  “Samaritan”: an Observer who intervenes only by transferring to the Receiver; 
-  “avenger”: an Observer who intervenes only by punishing the Dictator; 
                                                 
5 When the strategy method is used, subjects are asked their choice for each possible case. The final payoff is 
determined on the basis of the situation that actually occurs.  
6 Another possible explanation is that punishment in the SGT is higher than in the BT because the Observer 
thinks that s/he has to share with the Dictator the duty to give money to the Receiver. Consequently, the 





-  “judge”: an Observer who intervenes by choosing a combination of punishment and 
transfer. 
The change I made in the original version of the Third Party Punishment Game (by 
introducing the opportunity for the Observer to help the Receiver) makes it possible both to 
provide a more detailed classification of human types and to discover that the attitude of 
human beings to help those who suffer from an unfair behavior is strong and multifaceted - 
the desire of revenge is not the only emotion stimulated by people’s sense of justice. 
People care about the condition of the victims. In the BT the Observers are by necessity 
either “selfish” or “avengers”. Actually, some “selfish” may be “Samaritans” and most 
“avengers” may be “judges”.  
 
4  Comparison with social preferences theories 
To what extent are social preferences theories suitable to explain the results obtained 
in this experiment? Theories of unconditional altruism may explain why third parties 
decide to transfer money, but they never predict punishment.  
Fairness theories face several problems in explaining third party punishment. The 
model proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) may explain the behavior of the 
“Samaritans”, but not the behavior of  “judges” and of  “avengers”, who are the majority. 
The “avenger” and the “judge” behavior are not consistent with Fehr and Schmidt’s model, 
while the “Samaritan” behavior may be explained only when the Observer transfers to the 
Receiver an amount that is smaller than – or equal to – what the Dictator assigned. The 
models by Rabin (1993) and by Dufwenbeg and Kirchsteiger (2004) can predict neither 
third-party punishment nor third-party transfer. Actually, these models describe none of the 
types presented above.  
The hybrid model by Falk and Fischbacher (2000) and the DASM model by Kohler 
(2003) have the same prediction power as the model by Fehr and Schmidt. The hybrid 
model (social welfare concern + reciprocity) developed by Charness and Rabin (2002) may 
explain all types presented in this paper. The non-self-centred version of the model by Fehr 





Table 1.  P and T (Random Effect Tobit Model)   
 
Variables                                 Punishment                                   Transfer 
 
Player A’s transfer   -0.537***  -0.317*** 
  (0.074)  (0.076) 
Solomon  0.388       - 
  (0.464)        
Solomon*Player A’s 
Transfer   -0.444***       - 
  (0.134) 
Endowment  -1.032*  -0.985* 
  (0.531)  (0.594) 
Endowment* Player A’s 
Transfer  0.287*  -0.11 
  (0.152)  (0.12) 
Constant  1.395***  1.596*** 
  (0.313)  (0.431) 
 
n  47  31     
T  6  6 
N  282  186   
 
Log Likelihood  -244.18884  -213.37292 
 
Sigma_u  1.607***  1.561*** 









Table 2.  P and T in the SGT and in the EET (Bivariate Probit Model with cluster option) 
 
Variables                       Punishment            Transfer  Marginal  
      Effect (1,1)               
 
Player A’s transfer   -0.518***  -0.289***    -0.145***   
  (0.083)    (0.076)    (0.027) 
Endowment  -0.298    -0.69*    -0.121 
  (0.346)    (0.395)    (0.098) 
Constant  0.798***  1.135*** 
  (0.301)    (0.362) 
 
N    186         
Log Likelihood    -182.89875 
Rho    0.637 
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